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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CHANGE IN AFRICAN STUDENTS NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 May 82 pp 87-90

[Article by Sylviane Kamara: "From Politics to the Cafeteria"]

[Text] Not so long ago they were fighting for great causes. Today they are striking because the food at the university cafeteria is poor. Why have African students changed?

They stir things up, they demonstrate, they make demands, and they protest. High school and college students everywhere have acquired the reputation of being restless. In Africa they are no exception to the rule. Dakar, Yaounde, Abidjan, Kinshasa, Ouagadougou, Bamako, Casablanca, Tunis, Niamey, Tizi-Ouzou, Libreville or Soweto have all been proof of this at one time or another, and more often twice than once.

Student Population in French-speaking Black Africa

Country	Secondary Education					Higher Education			
	Schools, Lycees	Colleges of Ed.	Tech Schools	TOTAL	Law	Arts	Sciences	TOTAL	
Ben in	1970	21,049	171	912	22,132	1,051	1,283	958	3,292 (1978)
	1977	51,664	172	3,229	55,075 (29% F)	-	-	-	-
Burundi	1970	3,969	3,085	1,115	8,169	627	367	722	1,716 (1978)
	1980	7,967	6,525	1,918	16,410 (33% F)	-	-	-	-
Cameroon	1970	56,031	3,030	17,400	76,461	4,097	2,459	2,504	9,060 (1977)
	1978	147,073	1,677	49,866	198,916 (35% F)	-	-	-	-
CAR	1970	9,691	111	1,363	11,165	463(78)	756(78)	337(78)	743 (1976)
	1977	27,499	532	2,523	30,554 (21% F)	-	-	-	1,486 (1978)

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Country	Secondary Education					Higher Education			
	Schools, Lycees	Colleges of Ed.	Tech Schools	TOTAL	Law	Arts	Sciences	TOTAL	
Congo	1970	693	28	316	34,267	-	-	-	3,785 (1976)
	1979	3,099	102	505	159,218 (39% F)	-	-	-	4,767 (1978)
Ivory Coast	1970	62,356	1,622	5,123	69,101	1,725	4,689	2,287	8,701 (1976)
	1976	144,605	2,010(78)	13,961	127,492	1,899	5,676	2,626	10,201 (1978)
Djibouti	1978	758	36	509	1,385	-	-	-	-
	1980	2,551	63	610	3,123 (27% F)	-	-	-	-
Gabon	1970	8,244	131	1,608	9,983	247	653	345	1,245 (1976)
	1978	20,344	2,119	3,640	26,103 (38% F)	499	490	284	1,273 (1978)
Guinea	1970	59,908	1,478	2,013	63,399	1,495	1,425	9,392	14,241 (1976)
	1978	87,176	-	2,771		2,533	2,611	7,326	20,739 (1978): 1,929 unspec.
Upper Volta	1970	8,803	337	1,577	10,717	200	817	10	1,281 (1978)
	1979	20,529	257	4,327	25,113 (36% F)	-	-	-	-
Madagascar	1970	101,412	2,009	9,849	113,270 (40% F)	2,711	3,345	4,437	11,711 (1976)
	1975	131,836	-	-		2,483	6,412	6,912	16,226 (1978)
Mali	1970	29,683	29,683	3,386	34,620	410	1,977	1,192	3,576 (1976)
	1975	-	-	5,008	55,465	926	2,444	1,419	4,789 (1978)
Mauritania	1970	-	3,408	297	-	-	-	-	-
	1979	-	11,597	430(77)	-	-	-	-	-

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Country		Schools, Lycees	Colleges of Ed.	Tech Schools	TOTAL	Law	Arts	Sciences	TOTAL
	(?)	6,337	474	188	6,999	-	272	493	765
Niger	1979	25,583	1,259	354	27,196 (27% F)	-	402	537	939
	1970	7,398	1,606	1,255	10,259	63	576	524	1,117 (1976): 118 unspec.
Rwanda	1979	7,112	2,879	2,177	12,168 (33% F)	230	427	359(77)	1,134 (1977)
	1970	53,298	656	5,447	59,401	4,341	3,758	2,818	8,981
Senegal	1975	-	-	9,182		1,609	4,942	6,167	10,309
	1970	9,105	423	1,028	10,556	417	257	74	758 (1976)
Chad	1976	18,382	549	649	19,580	-	-		-
	1970	19,746	16	2,104	22,003	1,665	1,820	802	2,777 (1976)
Togo	1979	119,801	12	7,793	127,894 (24% F)	675	1,023	800	3,163 (1978)
	(?)	185,370	39,088	23,860	248,318	-	-	-	-
Zaire	1977	458,776	99,904	34,995	643,675	-	-	-	-

F designates the percentage of women.

There are no statistics for the Comoros. (Source: UNESCO Yearbook 1981)

The year 1980 was particularly eventful in this respect. Between January and May, student strikes affected Mali, Senegal, Zaire, Algeria, South Africa and Cameroon in turn--strikes, but also violence. The students' and professors' protest movement had become violent: burning cars, breaking windows; and the crackdown even tougher: one death in Senegal, one in Mali, many injured in Algeria and in South Africa, and imprisonments in Zaire. In 1981, it was the Gabonese, Malagasy, Cameroonian, and Moroccan students' turn. This year, the Senegalese and Nigerian students, as well as the Moroccans, struck; but it was the Ivorians and the Zairians, whose universities were closed for several days, who showed themselves to be the most belligerent.

The "student problem" is like malaria. It exists in a latent form, but no one pays any attention to it until an epidemic breaks out. Then they try in vain to get rid of it with an all-out effort.

Before the countries gained their independence, the students, scorning material things, were fighting for the liberation of their people. The 1970's saw the birth of struggles with political overtones, as in Dakar in 1968 or in Madagascar in 1972. Today, the demands have changed. "We were fighting for an ideal," says a "veteran" of the FEANF [Federation of

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Students from Black Africa in France] indignantly. "Now the young people are rushing into the streets because the rice in the university cafeteria is overcooked." This bitterness on the part of a former fighter conveys the gap which exists between the younger generations and their elders; for some former FEANF or student association activists are now on the other side: as ministers of national education or higher education, deans or vice chancellors. They do not identify with these 1982 vintage students who make a big fuss over administrative problems.

"These privileged students should be ashamed," we hear. "They are pursuing their studies thanks to the peasants' sacrifices. Instead of working to be of service to them in the future, they are twiddling their thumbs or breaking the equipment."

In countries where a farmer's annual income is not as much as a scholarship for one term, the argument--brought up again by men in high office whenever there is a crisis--carries weight.

In January 1978, the students at El-Hadj Omar Bongo University in Libreville went on strike to protest the increase in rates for dormitory rooms and the decrease in their stipends. In November 1979, aside from orientation problems, the lack of cafeterias was at the heart of the Bamako students' and professors' movement. In April 1980, Kinshasa students stopped going to classes to protest against the poor quality of the food, water, and transportation, and the delays in payment of stipends; while those in Yaounde were demanding that they be more widely distributed. Out of 9,400 students, only 5,000 were provided with stipends. In January 1982, four Dakar lycees went on strike due to low stipends and late payments. More numerous examples could easily be cited. Faced with these angry outbursts, the reaction of some governments is to use force or the argument of ingratitude. The consequence is that serious discussions--if not calm ones--cannot take place; except in cases such as in Senegal during the "etats generaux" of the Department of Education (28-31 January 1981). As far as the authorities are concerned, the students are too often wrong.

However, all it takes is an impromptu visit to any African school or university to be convinced of the reality of the problems decried by the rebels. Students and professors are confronted daily with overcrowded classrooms in which it is difficult to work properly due to lack of desks and chairs. Something or someone is always missing: paper for photocopies, stencils, books, window panes, lab equipment, medicine, nurses, doctors in the resident programs, teachers, libraries, information centers. You don't have to be a gourmet fanatic to notice that the university cafeterias and restaurants are of extremely dubious quality--who hasn't held his nose when passing by the kitchens at noon?--and the portions scanty.

And what is there to say about the often nonexistent means of transportation which oblige students to anxiously line the roadsides because they cannot afford to take taxis? As for the scholarships, although they are equal to the minimum wage in the Ivory Coast and Gabon, they are low everywhere else. And then, books, paper, and school supplies in general are expensive in Africa because they are imported.

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"All this," says a Cameroonian student, "shows the government's lack of interest in us." The conflicting dualism on each side is not helping comprehension of the problem at all: in Africa, general education is favored at the expense of technical and professional training; it is liberal (not aimed at specific opportunities), elitist (few students of school age have access to it), and expensive.

So, 12 French-speaking Black African nations devote more than 20 percent of their operating budget to it. The Congo, the Ivory Coast, Mali, and Zaire spend more than 25 percent. For all these countries have to face rapid growth in the number of young people, with the school age population doubling every 5 years.

Between 1968 and 1977, the number of students who passed the baccalaureat increased by 26 percent in Cameroon, 32 percent in the Congo, 24 percent in the Ivory Coast, 29 percent in Mauritania, and 23 percent in Gabon, with the average for the other nations located between 15 and 20 percent. The more students there are, the more money is needed; but state budgets have not increased proportionately. Today the system is jammed and a vicious circle has been formed.

In fact, the overcrowding of classes results in rapid deterioration of the premises, equipment, and the educational system itself which was planned to educate a much smaller number. The poorly understood and poorly--if at all--planned democratization of general education is leading to a true impasse. As an expert explains, "let us take the case of a nation which is watching the number of second level students increase by 25 percent per year, while the budget for education--21 percent of the total budget--is only increasing by 5 percent. Every year it must make up a 10 percent deficit. What can it do but distribute the debt?"

Teachers and students are even less willing to accept it when they too often have the opportunity to note the "ingratiating lack of concern" on the part of their leaders in allowing the privileged classes to grow rich completely illegally. "They would be better off seeking the money where it is," says a student indignantly, "than trimming our meat portions or our stipends." Furthermore, although the budgets cannot be extended, a better distribution of funds is possible and essential. The same is true of halting the wastefulness of paying part of the "cooperatives" wages which contribute both to the deficit and to national unemployment.

Feeling deprived, the students do not hesitate to demand what they feel to be the basic requirements for the pursuit of their studies and their success. Accustomed to the single party and its docile satellites (unions, youth and women's movements), the governments feel directly threatened by the student and lycee movements, which are being spontaneously created and therefore remain uncontrollable, or are the creation of pure and rigid organizations with whom it is difficult to compromise. At the slightest rumor of a strike, the full forces are employed: police, secret service, intervention teams, etc.--a type of reaction which workers' strikes rarely elicit. Confronted with political repression, the slogans become radical and can become frankly hostile to the regime. According to a report by the French

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Ministry of Cooperation (1980): "the political risks are now clear. Any attack on what the student population considers its vested interests results in unrest which can worsen rapidly and constitute a grave political threat."

In speaking of cafeterias, transportation, and stipends, the students are pinpointing the source of the problem: the absurdity for the African nations of perpetuating an extremely expensive system which excludes up to 70 percent of school age children in certain cases is a source of material and moral frustration to the teachers as it is to the students, and in the end generates unemployment.

So, is the choice between an educational system and a society? To avoid thinking about the former and so as not to appear to be yielding to the protests, the authorities on the whole are declaring that it is indeed the latter. If nothing is done to remedy a situation which can only grow worse, the student and lycee outbursts will increase and become more violent.

Perhaps it will then indeed be a question of changing society.

Bob Marley Follows Mao

During the vacation following my graduation in 1970, I read Mao Tse Tung's little red book and Karl Marx's voluminous "Das Kapital" with some passion.

From the beginning, it was not my ambition to assimilate the ideas of the two great theoreticians. It was more a matter of extracting passages with an impact from their works that I would use during various student demonstrations. A case of passing for a "good comrade." I jealously guarded a notebook under my pillow in which I recopied the passages. I learned them by heart.

I was not the only one who devoted myself to this "activist" literature. It was a craze. Like France, Senegal had its May '68. Some students who were killed during the wave of protests against the authorities were considered martyrs. Others were imprisoned or forced to enlist in the army. Among my generation there was a great desire to follow in their footsteps. To do this, you first had to be "avant-garde," in the terminology of the time. So, between 1970 and 1974, I pored over the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Trotsky, and Kim Il-sung religiously.

At the University of Dakar, the names of the prophets were Guevara, Nkrumah, Nasser, Nehru, Gandhi, and Angela Davis. The campus had its Marxist-Leninists, its Trotskyites, and even its pro-Albanians. The "in" vocabulary was full of words and expressions like imperialism, capitalism, neocolonialism, proletarian internationalism, class struggles, exploitation of the people, etc. A tract that I saved reads: "It is a matter of educating the masses in the revolutionary style of life, struggle, and work to develop a proletarian class awareness, so as to be truly in the vanguard of revolutionary combat and to effectively organize the people who will be the bulwark and the shield of the revolution." Wow!

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Now this image of a "revolutionary" student seems to be an anachronism. Of course, my brother (age 20), a law student at the University of Dakar, knows Marx, Lenin and Mao; but, he prefers Bob Marley, Fela and Jimmy Hendrix.

Today, disco, reggae and punk are in. Students skip political meetings to go jogging. They prefer "mouridism" to Marxism-Leninism. For close to 6 years, this brotherhood (one of the largest in the country) has been solidly established at the university. The association of "mouridist" pupils and students has more members than some political parties.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

PORTUGUESE COOPERATION WITH LUSOPHONE AFRICA REVIEWED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Apr. 82 pp 63-66

[Text] Portugal began to develop its cooperation with the countries using Portuguese as the official language immediately after decolonization. With each state, it signed general agreements on cooperation and friendship and scientific and technical cooperation agreements. In the sociocultural area, more than a dozen agreements and protocol-annexes were signed concerning social communication, health, education, and vocational training.

The implementation of these agreements takes the form of sending short-term technical missions, or advisers, and awarding of scholarships for vocational training. The following tables show the effort invested in these three areas.

The Portuguese cooperation effort involves all the ministries, departments, and companies with appropriate specialties. It is based on knowledge of the various stages of development of African states, and the concept of mutual help in respect for sovereignty and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the countries concerned, and also respect for national dignity in international affairs.

This is why Portuguese-African cooperation assumes the nature not of aid or philanthropy but of solidarity and friendship.

This kind of cooperation naturally benefits from the following factors, already recognized as positive and contributing to special relationships: the common language, a common cultural heritage, the presence of human capital with a direct familiarity with the situation in the countries concerned, and the existence in Portugal of organizations specialized in tropical area studies, such as the Institute of Tropical Hygiene and Medicine and the National Laboratory for Scientific Tropical Research.

The statistics in the tables also show, beyond the mere figures, the establishment of a genuine climate of friendship and understanding which is growing irreversibly.

This climate is evident in Portugal's relations with the Portuguese-speaking African states and confirmed by frequent official visits: for example, the visits by the Portuguese president to Cape Verde, the foreign minister to Angola, and the secretary of state for foreign affairs to Mozambique. In the

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opposite direction, Portugal has received the Mozambique foreign minister, the Angola minister of industry and energy, the Cape Verde minister of justice, and the Mozambique minister of industry.

Concrete results have been achieved in development of cooperation at all levels and in all sectors. For example, there was the recent second meeting of the joint permanent cooperation commission of Portugal and Angola which established new prospects for strengthening economic and cultural relations between the two countries.

The recent visit by Luanda by the president of the Portuguese Republic was a significant expression of the will of the two peoples to develop together their economic, financial, technical, and cultural relations, which provide substance to cooperation in the reciprocal interest of both those who are giving and those who are receiving.

There is continuing attention to all aspects of cooperation: the creation and promotion of a zone of mutual expression, active and dynamic, supported by the strong elements of language and common tradition.

To this end, Portugal has set in its embassies cultural centers with basic libraries, including magazines and newspapers and record collections. The majority of the users of these centers, in addition to the advisers, of course, are the local people thus attesting to the community of roots.

Another convincing proof of the Portuguese-African cooperation is the number of grant students in Portuguese universities, at the Higher School of Music and at the Bissau Law School who are benefiting from Portuguese technical aid. The same is true at the Teachers College, which is training secondary school teachers in Cape Verde, and there is also exchange of experience and documentation in almost all areas of public administration.

Short-Term Technical Missions

<u>Country</u>	<u>Technical Projects</u>	<u>Calendar Year</u>		
		<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982*</u>
Cape Verde	Projects	21	26	3
	Participants	69	40	7
Guinea-Bissau	Projects	5	3	-
	Participants	17	12	2
Sao Tome and Principle	Projects	6	5	-
	Participants	9	8	-
Angola	Projects	2	2	-
	Participants	3	5	-
Mozambique	Projects	3	4	1
	Participants	6	28	2
Total	Projects	37	40	4
	Participants	104	93	11

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<u>Country</u>	<u>Sector of Activity</u>	<u>Years</u>		
		<u>1979-80</u>	<u>1980-81</u>	<u>1981-82*</u>
Cape Verde	Teaching	27	27	26
	Health	1	4	1
	Miscellaneous	5	5	3
	Total	33	36	30
Guinea-Bissau	Teaching	103	92	38
	Health	2	11	6
	Miscellaneous	23	6	6
	Total	128	109	50
Sao Tome and Principe	Teaching	45	23	26
	Health	3	1	1
	Miscellaneous	4	2	1
	Total	52	26	28
Angola	Teaching	385	380	90
	Health	-	-	-
	Miscellaneous	-	-	-
	Total	385	380	90
Mozambique	Teaching	18	70	130
	Health	4	5	2
	Miscellaneous	2	4	-
	Total	24	79	132
Total	Teaching	578	592	310
	Health	10	21	10
	Miscellaneous	34	17	10
	Total	622	630	330

Study Grants and Vocational Training

<u>Country</u>	<u>School Year</u>	<u>1979-80</u>	<u>1980-81</u>	<u>1981-82*</u>
Cape Verde	Available	270	270	270
	Used	207	188	197
Guinea-Bissau	Available	270	290	290
	Used	149	203	105
Sao Tome and Principe	Available	150	170	170
	Used	128	104	109
Angola	Available	50	70	70
	Used	7	7	23

[continued]

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[Study Grants and Vocational Training--continued]

<u>Country</u>	<u>School Year</u>	<u>1979-80</u>	<u>1980-81</u>	<u>1981-82*</u>
Mozambique	Available	50	70	70
	Used	0	0	1
Total	Available	790	870	870
	Used	491	502	525

*As of 1 March 1982

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BADEA'S OPPOSITION TO RENEWAL OF TIES WITH ISRAEL NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 May 82 p 25

[Article by Samir Gharbi: "Hot and Cold"]

[Text] "Afro-Arab cooperation is resurfacing after a 3-year freeze. But without Egypt's involvement, it will fall back into a mellow lethargy." This clear warning from one African delegate stands in stark contrast to the optimism which marked the 28 April "Arab-African show," or rather the day of activities in Khartoum (Sudan) put together by Mr Chedly Ayari, president of the Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA).

The "Egyptian question" has admittedly had no effect on Arab financial commitments since the time of the first Arab-African summit, held in Cairo in March 1977. Indeed, with the Saudis and Kuwaitis in the lead, they have shown great generosity--doubling the amount of aid promised at the Cairo summit (\$3.2 billion, as opposed to \$1.5 billion for the period 1977-1980). But the "Israeli question" which has just surfaced is quite another matter. Mr Ayari did not mince words at the press conference he held on 1 May at BADEA headquarters in Khartoum: "Certain (African) abstentions on the vote in the United Nations against Israel's annexation of the Syrian Golan have made us think twice."

As for the restoration of the Sinai to Egypt, that should not be invoked by African states as grounds for renewing diplomatic ties with the Hebrew state. "Suppose Namibia became independent tomorrow. Would that justify the Arab states' restoring their ties with South Africa? Obviously not, for the very basic reason that apartheid would not have disappeared. Neither has zionism." Thus Malawi and Swaziland will remain on the Arab states' blacklist. And states that agitate for the resumption of relations with Tel Aviv will find their aid "reconsidered." This might happen to Zaire. In fact, after receiving the fattest "envelope" in 1977 (\$217 million), Kinshasa got only \$5 million in 1979, nothing in 1980, and 10 [as published] in 1981 (thanks to a credit BADEA itself provided).

A creation of the Arab summit at Algiers in November 1973, BADEA--a symbol of Arab appreciation of African states that broke with Israel--was intended to become a tool for development for all non-Arab African states. But BADEA's governors, who are none other than the finance ministers of the Arab countries,

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follow the policies of their respective governments. So in April 1979 they suspended Egypt as a member-state of the bank--whose directors nevertheless tried to reactivate the Arab-African cooperative entities, despite political problems.

In Khartoum, sub-Saharan representatives (about 10 of them) have been invited for the first time to address meetings and to speak privately with top officials of the Arab funds and OPEC as well as with BADEA's governors. Among those representatives, the most enthusiastic have been Mr Daouda Diallo, the Nigerian foreign minister; Mr Moussa Ngom, secretary general of the West African Economic Community (CEAO); and above all Mr Ousmane Seck, the Senegalese finance minister. "The Arab world," he said, "will play an indispensable role in Black Africa's development in the last years of the 20th century."

Mr Seck, who handed over a 50-page study to Mr Ayari, said that what is needed is to broaden multilateral cooperation and strengthen bilateral Arab-African relations in the context of the guidelines of the Lagos Plan. In addition to financing the infrastructure, such cooperation should include more systematic balance-of-payments support, budgetary support, and some private investment, as well as intensified trade (the Arab world takes only 2 percent of Africa's exports). Despite OPEC's reluctance, Chedly Ayari added a proposal for assistance in the energy field. So there is no lack of ideas on either side. But all this must await a second summit, which is the only means of giving this cooperation a new dimension.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

CUBAN ADVISORS'REPORTED DEPARTURE--According to the London TIMES, reporting a news item "communicated by the ambassador of Cuba in London to a Third World diplomat," a group of some 500 Cuban civilian advisors has left Angola over the past few weeks. The departure "is not related to political considerations": about 400 of these Cubans were working for the Angolan Ministry of Construction, which had no more work for them. The TIMES estimates the number of Cubans in Angola at 25,000, of whom 6,500 are civilian advisors. It does not know whether other groups of Cubans will soon be returning to Havana.

[Text] Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1294 [] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 12149

PURCHASES FROM FRANCE FUNDED-- The monthly bulletin of the Credit Lyonnais, dated April 1982, reports that the funding protocol was concluded last 5 March between that banking institution and the National Bank of Angola. The object of the protocol, in force until 25 February 1983, is funding purchases from France under the terms of the accord signed last 25 February between the Angolan and French governments, of soft wheat, barley malt, dairy products, frozen chickens, beef, potatoes, canned vegetables and fish, table wines of French origin and shipped from France. The overall envelope amounts to 240 million francs. The eligibility conditions for orders are: payment in francs, minimum unit value 1 million francs, approval of the appropriate authorities in both countries. Conditions and modalities of payment have been set as follows: 20 percent of the amount free on board by non-transferrable letters of credit to be used as deliveries are made upon presentation of the shipping documents, 80 percent through use of the credit account. The credits are to extend for 2 years, with repayment in equal successive six-monthly amounts. The interest rate in effect is 11.5 percent (of which 0.50 percent is COFACE [French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade]). Additional information may be obtained from the foreign trade department of the Credit Lyonnais, business section (Telephone 295-04-25) [Text] Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905 14 May 82 p 1294 [] [COPYRIGHT: Rene NMoreux et Cie Paris 1982] 12149

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

ITALIAN-SWEDISH ELECTRICITY CONSORTIUM--Equipment, including in particular bulldozers, trucks, and jeeps, was to be delivered at the end of April to the Electric Company of Mozambique. It is intended for construction work on the high tension line between Massingir and Maputo, a distance of 352 kilometers. The equipment delivery is the outcome of accords made between EM [Mozambique Electric Company] and the Italian-Swedish consortium SEDILMI-ASEA [expansion unknown] concerning the exchange value of 1.2 million contos. For this work-site, SEDILMI is responsible for the construction and installation of lines and sub-stations, as well as supplying all the line equipment; ASEA is responsible for supplying electrical and mechanical equipment for the sub-stations. It is to be noted that SEDILMI will assume responsibility for sub-stations at Infulene and Macia, while those at Lionde and Xai-Xai are the responsibility of a Mozambican company, Integral Gas Construction. Line construction operations will employ about 500 persons, as well as about 50 Italian and Swedish technicians. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1295] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 12149

PORTUGUESE AGRI-BUSINESS STUDY-- A study completed by a Portuguese consortium including the PROFABRIL and NORMA [expansions unknown] companies predicts the installation in Mozambique of new agri-business factories. Talks along these lines have taken place between Maputo and Lisbon. A "charter of intention" has been signed in the Mozambican capital with a view to working up a definite project and later putting it into practice. PROFABRIL will be in charge of actual construction, and NORMA in charge of issues connected with the management and organization of the new enterprises. Funding is assured through a line of credit open since last year with the Bank of Portugal. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1295] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 12149

BRAZILIAN SHRIMPING BOATS--Three shrimp boats, designed to work with a crew of 17, were recently supplied by Brazil, under a contract signed in 1976, to PESCAMAR [expansion unknown]. This Spanish-Mozambican mixed company, the result of an accord between the Mozambican state company EMOPESCA [expansion unknown] and the Spanish company PESCANOVA [expansion unknown], caught 3,200 tons of shrimp during the 1981 season, a tonnage slightly higher [as published] than the production objective set by the state central planning office at 3,250 tons; the company's catch is intended exclusively for export to Spain. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1295] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 12149

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PORTUGUESE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT--The Portuguese company Technical Construction has been charged with execution of the fishing docks construction work at Chiveva in Mozambique. It includes 432 meters of quays with berthing capabilities, made of reinforced concrete caissons, of which 360 meters go to a depth of -3.20 meters and 72 meters to a depth of -4 meters, infrastructures and superstructures; an inclined plane in the proportion of -1.25 meters, 10 meters wide and 81 meters long; extension of the city sewer by 150 meters and laying of pipes along 90 meters of the Chiveva shore, 32,000 square meters of terraces, 18,000 square meters of paving and drainage. / Excerpt / / Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1295 / / COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982 / 12149

BEIRA PORT DIFFICULTIES-- In mid-April, over 8,000 tons of assorted goods had been hung up for 6 months in the port of Beira. The greater part of them were equipment items intended for the future textile plant at Moemba; some packages are broken open and their contents exposed to sun and rain. The situation is partially explained by a total lack of coordination among freight companies and importers, more precisely among ADENA, ANFRENA, INTERMECANICO, AND INTERMETAL / expansions unknown /. Mr Alcantara Santos, minister of ports and land transport, has gone to the site to look into the situation and try to correct it. / Text / / Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82, p 1295 / / COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982 / 12149

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ABDOU DIOUF SAID TO HAVE PROVED TO BE GREAT CHIEF OF STATE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1906, 21 May 82
pp 1313-1315

[Unattributed article: " 'Post Senghor' Senegal: Abdou Diouf's First 15 Months"]

[Excerpt] A period of 15 months is a very short one to make an assessment of government action, especially in a developing country where climatic and economic handicaps restrain and compromise the best-laid plans. But still, it can be said that these 15 months have been enough for Abdou Diouf to prove that he is a great head of state.

During the first televised speech, President Senghor's successor invited his fellow citizens to meet with him the four challenges for the Eighties, the "4 E's": Water, Employment, Education, Energy. What has come of it since January 1981?

Rain from Subsoil and Sky

In the government formed by Prime Minister Habib Thiam, water problems were entrusted to a secretary of state. A few months later, the secretary of state, Samba Yela Diop, was promoted to minister, just as the 6th plan was getting under way. A fund of 37,381 million CFA francs was allocated to this ministry to implement its program. Multinational projects add to this envelope.

It is a sign of the importance that the head of state attaches to the water problem. About 2.7 billions will be devoted to hydrogeological studies. Many projects are directed toward improving supply to cities and large agglomerations to realize the password: "High quality water in sufficient quantity for all levels of the population."

But it is the rural areas, the most disadvantaged, that are the object of the government's priority attention. The emergency program plans 10 billion for the completion of fitted wells in 302 villages, 750 million for run-off water storage, 600 million for irrigation from wells.

The actual start of work on the Dama dam on the Senegal river delta marks an important stage of the Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS). Work on Manantali dam should soon be started. The completion of the irrigated areas

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is a task that will be spread over nearly half a century. This grandiose project should not overshadow the smaller dams that the Gambia River Development Organization (OMVG) is going to build at Kekreti and Balingho. Several Casamance tributary valleys will also be developed.

The rainy season in the first year of Abdou Diouf's presidency was anxiously awaited. It was reasonably good, though certain abnormalities and the early cessation of rainfall prevented the record harvests for which hopes had been raised at certain periods.

The ground-nut harvest amounted to 830,000 tons. What is more important is the abundance of millet, which, along with rice, is in the first rank of foodstuffs. With 700,000 tons gross production, there will be a shortage of 60,000 tons to meet needs. On the other hand, a 57,000 ton maize harvest, for an average consumption of 23,000 tons, will make it possible to make up a part of the food deficit. But still, 250,000 tons of rice will have to be imported to complement the 34,000 tons produced locally.

For its part, with at least 33,000 tons and a yield of 1.2 tons per hectare, cotton has already exceeded the planned 1984 goals.

Jobs for All

In his platform speech on 1 January 1981, the head of state had promised that before the end of the month, 100 young unemployed graduates would be hired. The promise was kept. But this symbolic gesture was not enough to get rid of unemployment. In his message to the nation last 4 April, Abdou Diouf again spoke of his concern over this problem. He announced a new strategy "to help in the achievement of multiple community projects in rural as well as urban environments and to promote non-structured employment."

Research and funding organizations (National Research and Industrial Promotion Company: SONEPI, and National Financial Company for the Development of Industry and Tourism: SOFISEDIT) have identified, by regions, 450 projects for setting up small and medium enterprises and are actively engaged in promoting them.

The Dakar Free Industrial Zone (ZFID) was created in 1976 to promote the implantation of job-creating industries. In 5 years, only six or seven enterprises have been installed there, and some have never really operated. Since July 1981, fresh impetus has been given the ZFID. On 4 January 1981, the prime minister laid the foundation stone for three new units (plastics, enamel work, pharmaceutical and cosmetic products: see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 29 January 1982, page 257). Two other companies (sporting goods manufacture, sugar milling) are in the start-up stage. Two enterprises have been accepted (deep-freezing, medical equipment). Finally, about 40 projects are under study by investors, mainly Brazilian, French, Italian, and Senegalese (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 December 1981, page 3239).

Mutual Agreement Among All Educators

At his succession to the supreme office, Abdou Diouf found a tense situation in the domain of education, in which teachers' strikes were expected. The

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president of the republic announced that broad joint discussions would be held as soon as possible. The month of January was not yet over when the States General of education were held. For nearly a week, all parties involved in the problems of education were able to express their point of view freely: government, teachers, students' parents, unions, political parties, religious authorities, etcetera. Deliberations were led mainly by the Sole Democratic Trade Union of Senegalese Teachers (SUDES), which has been making life difficult for the government since 1976. SUDES arrived at the meeting with a coherent program of which the essential points were accepted. A plan for reforming and promoting teaching was adopted. For a year now, commissions have been meeting to make these resolutions into facts. It is a long drawn-out task (for example, as concerns promotion of the national languages) and it will take at least 10 years to bring it to its conclusion.

However, joint consultation has replaced confrontation. At its third ordinary congress (26-28 December 1981), SUDES made changes in its leadership and elected as its president a man less politically notorious than his predecessor. Whereas in the past one political trend dominated the union, the range of commitments is now broader among the leaders.

New Energies

Like most African countries, Senegal has suffered severely from the rise in oil prices. However, the rise will probably enable it to start developing the offshore oilfield discovered off the Casamance coast. Legal structures already exist.

A less usual source of energy will soon partially replace oil: peat. A huge field has been identified along the Atlantic coast between Dakar and Saint-Louis. Scandinavian specialists have recognized the excellent heat-producing properties of this peat compared to other known fields. Again, the legal structure already exists: the Senegal Peat-Bog Company, a mixed economy company, was founded on 21 January 1982. And soon an electric power station will be able to use the new fuel.

The fact remains that Senegal's main energy hope is in the sun. Several experimental stations exist. But the real start will not be made until the day when research perfects cheap elements capable of transforming solar rays directly into electricity: photo-voltaic cells are still much too expensive to be really to be cost-effective. University of Dakar researchers are continuing their work. And it is reasonable to hope that one day, all agglomerations of any size will have their little power station to draw water, operate small industries and bring household convenience to everybody.

Statesman's Stature

In the weeks preceding the passage of power between Presidents Senghor and Diouf, the most pessimistic rumors were circulating: there was talk of demonstrations, even a coup d'etat. Despite the qualities everyone agreed he had, the legitimacy of President Abdou Diouf was questioned. The opposition rejected the succession procedure settled by the constitution and called for elections. Even within the majority party (the Socialist Party), some considered

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that the new president had not gone through all the channels and that others had an activist past that gave them them priority over the young crown prince.

In fact the succession took place quietly, in an atmosphere of grandeur and dignity that it would have been hard to find in some other African states. And as of the evening of 1 January, the Senegalese knew that they had a new "boss." Leopold-Sedar Senghor had already warned those who found his prime minister too modest and self-effacing: "Abdou Diouf is harder than you think; you will soon find out." In his first televised address as head of state, Abdou Diouf gave proof that it would be with his own very characteristic personality that he would "assume the continuity of Senghor's activity and conduct changes."

A journalist said of him: "He seems real because he is real." Two essential traits impress those who approach him: his capacity for attention and his firmness of decision. President Abdou Diouf listens, to the visitor in his office as well as to the crowd on the street. He is fond of saying "Do not think of me as your "bour" (king), but as your "jaam" (slave)." So long as he has not reached a decision, he seeks information and accepts all suggestions. Thanks to a prodigious memory and methodical work, he reaps the benefits of all elements of assessment.

And when he has reached a conviction, he makes up his mind. Then he is a leader who does not tolerate negligence or carelessness in the execution of his orders. To crowds, he communicates his decisions without the demagogical eloquence of a tribune, but with a sincerity that is not misleading: "The words spoken," he says, "must be in conformity with actions. That is more important than charisma." This honesty toward his people is founded on very strong convictions, great depth of feeling, and a religious faith that excludes any sectarianism.

Trumps for the Election

We have mentioned the first measures taken to pick up the four challenges of the end of the 20th century. Other decisions have placed in the hands of the new president some trump cards that he will certainly know how to play at the 1983 election.

First of all, there is the extension of democracy. Until now, the constitution recognized four parties: the Socialist Party, in office, and three opposition parties. Of these, only one, the Senegalese Democratic Party, had a parliamentary representation of 18 out of the 100 deputies comprising the National Assembly. Today, half of them have left the party as a result of blunders committed by its chairman, Abdoulaye Wade: an ill-timed appeal to the army at the succession, opposition to Senegalese intervention in Gambia, ambiguous relations with Libya, etcetera. To tell the truth, the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] is mainly the party of the malcontents who have left the PS [Socialist Party]. The African Independence Party (Marxist) is threatened by internal dissension and the gradual fading out of its long-term head, the pharmacist Majhmout Diop. The Senegalese Republican Movement (conservative), headed by the lawyer Boubacar Gueye, has never been much of a force.

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The clandestine opposition movements seem more dangerous. Their very clandestinity conferred an aura on them and created a false impression of their representativity. The extension of democracy has revealed a very different reality. The Marxist opposition shattered into six or seven little groups of all allegiances: Chinese, Albanian, etcetera, which have practically no chance at the elections, even though their press is read with curiosity by a fair number of Senegalese. Two organizations are more serious: the National Democratic Rally of Professor Cheikh Anta Diop, and the People's Democratic Movement of former President Mamadou Dia. But for the moment, neither of them seems likely to threaten the supremacy of the Socialist Party.

The extension of democracy has been complete since the adoption of the new election law. It was submitted to the National Assembly on 1 May, and was based on the German system. There will be 120 deputies, of whom half will be elected on a proportionate basis out of a national slate presented by each party, and the other half elected by uninominal majority vote of 60 electoral precincts. The advantage of this system is that it makes it possible for small parties to be represented in the Assembly, while giving every opportunity to independents with a strong local support base.

For the peasants are still very little affected by intellectual contests. But on the other hand, they did appreciate the first measures taken for their benefit by the new government. Cancellation of 17 billion CFA francs in debts accumulated over the last few seasons means that they no longer face the prospect of working just to repay them. The suppression of ONCAD (National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development), a hard-to-check hydra that existed at the expense of the peasants that it claimed to serve, has still not yet borne all its fruits. The implementation of means and organizations for collecting and marketing cannot be accomplished in a single move. But during the year just past, the minister of rural development, Serigne Lamine Diop, traveled the country reviving the cooperatives. This is an indispensable step in the reconstruction of an agricultural economy that benefits the peasants first.

Another spectacular measure by President Abdou Diouf was the definition of the crime of illegal accumulation of wealth, and the implementation of bodies (investigation and conviction) empowered to repress it. It is not, as is sometimes stated, a retroactive law. But after the finding of an "immediate offence" (the existence of examples of obvious wealth, private houses, cars, lavish spending for family ceremonies, out of keeping with the declared resources), the magistrates make inquiries into the origin of this property, and pursue persons who have acquired their fortune through fraudulent means, bribery and embezzlement, for example. The first arrests have already occurred. And the public is watching the development of this activity with a certain amount of fear. The mass of Senegalese agrees with the head of state, but fears that he will not be able to follow through completely. For sooner or later he will have to involve the regime's "barons."

Investiture by his Peers

A few weeks after his accession to supreme office, Abdou Diouf in a way received investiture by his peers. At the Islamic summit in Taif, he was

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chosen to be the spokesman for Africa. And Senegalese television showed at length the pictures of the head of state making a pilgrimage to the holy places of Islam.

The OAU summit in Nairobi brought President Abdou Diouf the same ratification: he was chosen to speak for all the heads of state in response to their host, Kenyan President arap Moi. The two ratifications had been prepared by the efficient efforts of of the Senegalese minister of foreign affairs, Moustapha Niasse.

Though Abdou Diouf immediately asserted himself as a statesman of international stature, he has still devoted a large part of his diplomatic activity to the promotion of regional and subregional organizations. He has visited all Senegal's neighboring countries. The most important of these undertakings took place in Ivory Coast, where he was the guest of one of the last of the "greats" of decolonization, the "Old Man," President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. He came back with the unreserved "stamp of approval" of his senior, who had recognized in him the worthy successor of Senghor.

A statesman is recognized by the skill and perseverance with which he directs a carefully prepared policy, but also by his ability to meet unexpected situations. On 30 July 1981, Abdou Diouf found himself facing a major decision: should he intervene in Gambia, where a bloody coup d'etat had just overthrown President Douda Jawara? The Senegalese president was not only able to make up his mind quickly, but the Senegalese troops performed with efficiency and skill. They kept losses down, avoided clashing with the local population, and in all areas restored order that had been disturbed by a few irresponsible persons. President Diouf's talent was also revealed in the way in which he immediately took advantage of the event to induce the Gambian government, with an international public looking on, to take the initiative in asking for the establishment of a Senegambian confederation. This is doubtless the first step toward the merging of the two countries.

The Senegalese army has had another opportunity to assert the prestige of its country and its president. After participating in United Nations action in Lebanon, a Senegalese contingent went to Chad at the request of the OAU.

The 1983 Deadline

Though nobody in Senegal seriously disputes President Abdou Diouf's ability and personal integrity, there are some who think that he should accelerate the changes to be introduced in the staffing, structures, and methods of the state. Others, on the other hand, find some of his actions and intentions dangerous.

In fact, it will only be possible to see Abdou Diouf really at work a year from now, if he is reelected president of the republic, which seems likely. Senghor's crown prince needs the sanction of universal suffrage to have a free hand, he needs the explicit support of the masses to start certain reforms. Then he will be able to give impetus to the purging of high state officials and disarm the feudal system that is still impeding government action.

It is a fact that interference by religious figures in public life, in particular in the fight against corruption, is less noticeable. But the principle of the secularity of the state is a long way from being fully respected.

And unfortunately, foreign pressures are now beginning to pick up where local lobbies leave off. Senegal's participation in the solidarity strike for the people of Palestine on 14 April, in response to the appeal by King Khaled of Saudi Arabia, was not well received, even in Moslem circles. Everybody is complaining that if Senegal had not urgently needed petrodollars at the time, it would merely have given moral support to the movement, which would have been more in keeping with its dignity and its desire for independence.

President Abdou Diouf is engaged in a difficult fight. Heaven has already shown support for him by dropping enough rain in 1981. The free countries must now do everything possible so that he is not forced to accept for his country dependence on Arab neo-colonialism.

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UPPER VOLTA

SUMMARY OF 1981 ECONOMIC SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 May 82 pp 1396-97

[Text] Although it has probably been less severe than in some other nations of the Sahel, the 1980 drought has had a heavy impact on Upper Volta nevertheless.

The 1980/1981 harvests clearly felt its effects: except for karite nuts, all agricultural production was down, sometimes significantly.

The decrease in purchasing power of the peasants as well as of the wage earners, slowed the growth in industrial and commercial activity; a slight drop in gasoline consumption was even recorded.

The combination of adverse factors seems to have had repercussions on public finances at the end of the year since, for the first time in a long while, the government had to resort to advances from the banking system.

On the other hand, the steadiness of world prices in francs for cotton and oilseeds, and the abundant supply of karite nuts contributed to a rather significant increase in exports. As imports only showed a moderate increase, the trade balance seems to have improved, while as customary remaining heavily in the red. As for the balance of payments, it doesn't seem to have worsened, judging from the growth in net foreign assets.

Unfortunatley, 1982 does not look much better for Upper Volta. Of course, the 1981/1982 grain and sugar harvests were better; but we still don't know if the karite nut harvest, which varies greatly from one year to another, will be as abundant as it was last year. On the other hand, we do know that cotton production will drop again. Besides, there is every reason to believe that world prices in francs for cotton and oilseeds will be lower than in 1981.

Under these conditions, the possibility of a decrease in exports and a worsening of the trade deficit is not to be excluded. It may also be feared than the National Treasury and the Stabilization Fund may experience some difficulties.

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Agricultural Production

Although it affected Upper Volta relatively less severely than some other Sahel countries, the drought did have repercussions which were very clearly unfavorable to Upper Volta's 1980/1981 harvests.

Thus, grain production barely exceeded 1 million tons, as compared to 1.17 million tons in 1979/1980; as for the quantity sold by OFNACER, which was 15,300 tons in 1978/1979, it fell to 8,700 tons in 1979/80, and to just 2,600 tons in 1980/81.

The combined decrease in area cultivated and in yield also resulted in a drop in cotton production from 77,500 tons to 62,500 tons.

A drop in sugar production was also recorded in 1980/81 (25,500 tons)-- 8 percent below 1979/80 (27,840 tons), and 18 percent below the record achieved in 1978/79 (31,000 tons).

As for sesame sales, they were cut in half (2,111 tons in 1980/81, as compared to 4,236 in 1979/80).

Only the karite nut harvest, which always varies greatly, was satisfactory, as it amounted to 50,700 tons as compared to 40,100 tons in 1979/80, and 7,000 tons in 1978/79.

Due to milder weather conditions and somewhat of an increase in producer prices, the results of the 1981/82 harvest on the whole should be markedly improved.

In fact, the grain harvest is estimated at 1.28 million tons, or 25 percent above the previous harvest. In any case, the harvest is off to a very good start. As for sugar production, it should increase to close to 27,000 tons.

Only cotton production may drop again, probably to 56,000 tons, due to a significant decrease in area cultivated and despite a slight improvement in yields.

Industrial Production

In the absence of an Upper Voltan measure of industrial production, an idea of the activity of industrial establishments located in Upper Volta can be formed by referring to the consumption of high voltage electric power.

In 1981, consumption continued to grow, in the private sector at least, but much less strongly than during previous years: in fact, there was no more than an 8 percent increase, as compared to 14 percent in 1980 and 22 percent in 1979.

For the first time in a long while, public sector consumption decreased rather significantly (9 percent).

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Domestic Business Activity

Despite the mediocre results of the 1980/81 agricultural harvest, the "merchandise" sales volume of major commercial establishments increased in 1981.

Considering the erosion of the currency, however, the growth in this index which is calculated by the BCEAO [Central Bank of the West African States] (16 percent for the first 9 months) can be considered rather weak.

Besides, a slight drop in gasoline consumption and a standstill in diesel oil shipments were observed in 1981. Among petroleum products, only gas/oil (+ 7.5 percent) and petroleum (+ 9 percent) showed an increase in sales. It is true that in Upper Volta, as elsewhere, petroleum prices increased significantly in 1981: + 28 percent for gasoline and + 52 percent for diesel oil.

Domestic Prices

Judging from trends in the index of African consumer prices published monthly by the National Institute of Statistics and Demography, during 1981 inflation was maintained within limits which can be considered satisfactory. For the year as a whole, the increase only amounted to 9.4 percent, as compared to 12.2 percent in 1980, and 30.5 percent in 1978.

When various industry sectors are examined, however, varying trends are observed which are surprising. In fact, although food and housing costs increased by 13.8 percent and 20 percent respectively, clothing and health costs decreased by more than 20 percent.

Whatever the case, the absence of any increases in the interoccupational guaranteed minimum wage since 1 January 1979 has definitely caused a decrease in purchasing power for wage earners. Moreover, at the beginning of 1982, the government took steps to remedy this.

Foreign Trade

Export quantities: in 1981, shipments of goods by railway from Upper Volta to the Ivory Coast--for which we unfortunately do not have a breakdown yet--totaled 100,000 tons, in other words significantly less than in 1978 (142,000 tons), 1979 (127,000 tons), and 1980 (more than 112,000 tons).

On the other hand, during the first 3 quarters, air shipments, which include fruits and vegetables in particular, amounted to 2,100 tons, representing a 40 percent increase over the corresponding period of the previous year.

Exports in value: along with Cameroon and the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta is one of the few French-speaking black African countries to publish its foreign trade statistics without too much delay.

Thus, we know that during the first 9 months of 1981, Upper Voltan exports amounted to 17.2 billion CFA francs, as compared to 14 billion in 1980.

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The most significant growth was recorded for cotton (+ 20 percent)--despite somewhat of a decrease (6 percent) in quantity sold--leather and hides (+ 28 percent), vegetables (+ 36 percent), and especially karite nutes (+ 88 percent).

On the other hand, declines were noted, especially in livestock (14 percent) and in sesame (29 percent), the distribution of which, despite the low supply, seems to have posed problems.

Considering trends in customs receipts, 4th quarter 1981 results may be less satisfactory than those for the first 3 quarters. However, it must be stressed that for 1981 on the whole, French imports from Upper Volta (69.7 million French francs) increased by 11.3 percent over 1980 (62.6 million French francs), while French purchases from all African members of the franc zone--not including petroleum--decreased by 6.4 percent.

Import quantities: goods shipped by railroad from the Ivory Coast to Upper Volta amounted to 315,000 tons in 1981. There was a slight drop in comparison to 1978 (326,000 tons) and 1979 (329,000 tons). The decrease was more significant when compared to 1980 (299,000 tons for 3 quarters).

Imports in value: during the first 9 months of 1981, the value of imports amounted to 66.7 billion CFA francs--in other words, 15 percent over the corresponding period of the previous year.

Petroleum products were responsible for close to one third of this increase. On the other hand, a significant decrease (21 percent) in foreign grain purchases was observed.

Considering trends in customs receipts, we can estimate that the 4th quarter results are more or less comparable to those for the first 3 quarters. It is therefore probable that import values for the year on the whole increased by around 15 percent. Besides, this percentage corresponds to the growth in French exports to Upper Volta in 1981 (15.2 percent).

Trade Balance: the Upper Voltan trade balance traditionally shows a heavy deficit. During the first 9 months of 1981, only 25.8 percent of imports were balanced by exports.

This percentage slightly exceeded the percentage recorded during the corresponding period of the previous year (24.1 percent). Nevertheless, it was comparable to those observed each year since 1977 (between 18.8 and 26.5 percent).

The Monetary Situation

Net foreign assets: in the absence of the balance of payments, which is always slightly delayed, we can refer to currency statistics on net foreign assets to form an idea of the trend in Upper Volta's financial operations abroad.

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For Upper Volta, net foreign assets have shown a continuously negative balance since December 1977. The balance became positive in March 1981 again. However, the relief was rather shortlived, since at the end of November it was negative again.

However, it must be stressed that between November 1980 and November 1981, assets increased by 1.3 billion CFA francs. Within the same period, Upper Volta reimbursed the IMF in the amount of 1.2 million dollars for trust fund loans.

Bank Credit to the State

For a very long time, the Upper Voltan government has been a bank system creditor. In 1981, it was one for the greater part of the year. However, in the month of September the situation reversed itself and, for the first time in a long while, the government had to request loans from the lending institutions and the banks.

Although the bank system's credit position with regard to the government was negative in November 1980, 1 year later credit extended to the government exceeded 1 billion CFA francs--in other words, in all probability the Upper Voltan Government experienced difficulties with funds at the end of the year.

Revenue: Due to the weak 1980/81 harvest, revenue increased very little last year: between 30 December 1980 and 30 November 1981, it did not increase by more than 10 percent--which, considering price increases, means somewhat of a standstill in economic activity.

Money Supply: Despite the moderate increase in revenue, the money supply increased rather significantly (20 percent at an annual rate), basically due to the effect of the increase in bank system aid to the government. This is a phenomenon to which Upper Volta was not accustomed and which, if it continues, would become a concern.

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ZAIRE

RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL ANALYZED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1117, 2 Jun 82 pp 28-31

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "The Seduction of Mobutu"]

[Text] "There is still a racial problem which must be solved. Only a Jew can understand its full dimension. I am referring to the African problem." The preceding remarks were not made by Menachem Begin, whose ties with the apartheid regime, the only political regime in the world openly based on racial discrimination, are well known (see article by Francois Soudan, page 32). These words were written by Theodor Herzl, early in this century, in his book 'Alt Neuland' [Old-New Land], a sort of Zionist Bible.

Later, much later, an African statesman repeated this observation when he proclaimed: "Israel has become a pilgrimage shrine for African countries seeking a source of inspiration to build their countries." And it was not Mobutu Sese Seko who voiced this belief as a way of explaining his decision to reestablish diplomatic relations between Zaire and Israel on 14 May 1982. The man who said it was former President Mobido Keita of Mali who, in the early sixties, was trying to instill into his country a "pioneer spirit" inspired by the myth of that period: the myth of the Israeli pioneers who "were making oranges grow in the desert."

Twenty years went by. The myth has vanished. Oranges are not growing in the Sahel and even less in the Sahara. All because Africans do not have the same means as the Jewish Diaspora which bankrolled the orange groves of the Negev at an exorbitant cost only to glorify Israeli "technology." Africa discovered the nature of Israel--intransigent, domineering, self-assertive. The 1973 October War brought Israeli-African relations to an end. Africa, out of solidarity with Egypt--part of whose territory had been occupied since 1967--and with the Palestinians--deprived of a homeland by the will of Tel Aviv--expelled the Israelis from African territory. At the beginning of 1982, and apart from South Africa, only two governments continued to allow an Israeli official representation in their countries, Malawi and Swaziland. Everywhere else, the front of solidarity with the Arab countries and against Israel stood firm. Zaire has opened the trail for an Israeli return to Africa. This was a diplomatic success for Israel, which looks at it as the successful outcome of a seduction campaign launched less than 2 years ago and finished off with a "sustained pressure" for a period of barely 6 months.

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The signing, in 1979, of the Camp David Accords establishing peace between Egypt and Israel, was the basis for the offensive launched by Tel Aviv against Black Africa. In March 1980, Eliashiv Ben Horin visited Kenya, Zambia and the Ivory Coast as ambassador extraordinary to put out feelers. His message to the Africans was: "You broke off relations with us in solidarity with Egypt but now that Egypt has signed a treaty with us, you are free of your obligations. They answered him: this is still not the right time for a resumption of diplomatic relations. On the other hand, the OAU heads of state steadily refuse to denounce Camp David to the utter displeasure of the hard-liners in the Arab League.

Always at Israel's initiative, other contacts (secret ones) took place as indicated by small remarks made by prominent African personalities. In December 1980, in Nigeria, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the main opposition leader--who was the defeated candidate in the presidential elections of the previous year--spoke in favor of "resuming diplomatic relations with Israel in the interest of the country." Two months later, in February 1981, Kenyan parliamentarians who had been invited to visit Israel by Moshe Shahal, a Labor Party member of the Knesset, canceled their visit at the last moment. The Israeli Radio had triumphantly announced that they were coming.

The blunder did not discourage Tel Aviv. Early in March, Rahamin Timor, the director for international cooperation, toured Africa quietly from east to west. Objective: to strengthen Israel's economic cooperation with Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi (which had never broken off relations), Nigeria and the Ivory Coast. In mid-March 1981, the JERUSALEM POST disclosed that David Kimche, director general in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had made a quiet visit to Kenya but had not been able to go to Zimbabwe. This former director of the Africa division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was being tapped, at the time, for the post of head of the Mossad (secret service).

This long march to Africa ended with a sprint. In mid-November 1981, Ariel Sharon, the strong-armed defense minister, led an important delegation (of 5 or 15 high-ranking officials, depending on the sources) which visited "African countries likely to be the target of Libyan incursions," namely Central Africa, Gabon, Zaire. Jerusalem did not report the trip until 3 December. A day before that, on 2 December 1981, the Zairian president said in Washington: "We could reestablish relations with Israel immediately." This coincided with Israel's annexation of the Golan, a step that could only cause embarrassment to any African candidate for reconciliation. So much so that Kinshasa felt compelled to overdo it. On 5 January, Kamanda Wa Kamanda, the Zairian representative in the United Nations, voted in favor of a Security Council resolution condemning Israel. He was sharply reprimanded by President Mobutu who, as reported by the American press, wrote to Ronald Reagan to tell him that his ambassador to the United Nations had misunderstood his instructions. From then on Zaire abstained in all votes against Israel.

The process started rolling. Inexorably. All the more so since the evacuation of the Sinai, on 25 April 1982, eliminated the last qualms. There was no longer any occupied portion of territory belonging to an African

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state, as the OAU had demanded. What was forgotten was that the OAU had also demanded "that the Palestinian people must recover all their national and legitimate rights." Mobutu did certainly say in December: "Zaire is not the only country in Africa. There must be consultations with other African countries. For the time being, I am waiting to see what the others will do."

But he did not wait. The weekly letter 'Telex Confidentiel' of JEUNE AFRIQUE reported (in its issue No 30 of 7 May 1982) that Mobutu could "announce the resumption of diplomatic relations between Kinshasa and Tel Aviv on 20 March at the Congress of the MPR (People's Revolutionary Party), Zaire's single party." The MPR congress was postponed until November. The resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel was brought forward to 14 May. There was a general outcry in the Arab world. All the more so because, initially, the Zairian Government had decided to establish its embassy in Jerusalem, El Quds, the holy city seized by the Jewish state. This was the supreme affront for the Arab world. Kinshasa took a half-step back when it announced, on 20 May, that its embassy would open, after all, in Tel Aviv out of consideration for the UN resolutions condemning Israel's decision to turn Jerusalem into its "eternal capital city." The Arab countries were still not satisfied. Riyadh broke off relations with Kinshasa. Other countries did the same. The PLO called for a boycott against Zaire. All Arab aid was suspended. This was a serious warning to any country which may be tempted to follow suit.

In actual fact, what other African countries could widen the breach opened by Zaire? The question does not even arise in the case of countries which are members of the Arab League or in the case of countries where Islam has a strong influence, such as the Comores where the government was vehemently indignant. Countries claiming to be revolutionary or anti-imperialist can also be discounted. But if Jerusalem is to be believed, several governments, known to be moderate, were only waiting for Zaire to lead the way. In the confusion following Kinshasa's decision, several countries were mentioned--Ivory Coast, Gabon, Togo. They strongly proclaimed their adherence to the position adopted by the OAU in 1973 and after being thus singled out, they are not likely to decide to resume relations with the Jewish state in the very near future.

Right now, Israel wants to press its advantage and has revealed that 4,000 Israeli experts are still working in Africa. The lack of diplomatic relations has not been an obstacle to trade relations: Israeli exports to Africa increased from \$30 million to \$100 million in 7 years, according to Naftahil Blumenthal, director general of the Korr Industries, Israel's leading industrial group. Israeli enterprises are working in several countries, particularly in public works and housing projects. In Tanzania, an Israeli company will build an international hotel in Arusha. It is true that President Julius Nyerere has always demonstrated great independence regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict: "We will not allow our friends to choose our enemies," he said. President Omar Bongo of Gabon, a less doctrinarian and more direct person, wants Arab-African solidarity to be a two-way street: "Arabs must understand that it was only out of solidarity

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that the African countries broke off relations with Israel. They, in turn, must deposit their money in our countries instead of in Geneva and in the United States."

Black Africa has not really been short of Arab money. From 1973 to mid-1981, Arab countries or Arab institutions have made financial commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa totaling \$6.670 billion. The main recipient country, Guinea, received \$604.6 million in credits, and 85 percent of them under preferential terms. Senegal is said to have received \$423.3 million and can expect additional funding. Total investments in Mali amount to \$345.5 million and in Niger to \$273.8 million. Logically, these figures seem to explain why some countries are not prepared to follow in the footsteps of Zaire.

Yet it would be unfair to say that African solidarity with the Arab countries, and against Israel, is solely based on promises of financial support. Proof of this is the fact that, after Guinea, Zaire was the second highest recipient of financial Arab aid--\$444.4 million in less than 8 years with three-quarters of this sum already received. The other quarter will not arrive. There will be no further financial commitments. Mobutu knew it and took a chance. Money, then, does not explain everything.

The road taken by Senegal, although different from the one taken by Zaire, also proves that money alone is not the deciding factor in the matter of solidarity with the Arabs. In the case of Senegal, religion was an important factor. Social pressure and the particularism of the Islamic religion in Senegal, confer an almost political dimension to the religious brotherhoods, especially the 'mourides' and the 'tidianes' (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1096). Solidarity with the Arab countries is of a religious nature and there is a gut reaction against the "sacrileges" committed by the Israelis against Islam. This is why after the slaughter which took place in the forecourt of the Mosques of Al-Aqsa and Omar, on 11 April in Jerusalem, the protest strike called by the government was widely followed.

Other countries do not have to deal with such large Moslem communities. Nor are they the recipients of money from Arab funding institutions. A case in point is the Ivory Coast which, among all the countries that broke off relations with Israel in 1973, is the one that received less from the Arabs and did not ask for anything either: it got a total of \$58 million in 8 years, slightly more than what Cameroon received in a single year (\$55.8 million in 1981). And what is more, the Ivory Coast did not get preferential terms for any of that amount: 89 percent of the credits were given at prevailing conditions in the market. The United States would have done better. But for all that Houphouet-Boigny is not about to decide to resume relations with Israel. He has still not forgotten that the Israelis "betrayed" him in 1977 when Jerusalem made public the contents of his talks with Yitzhak Rabin. And Begin is not the man likely to appease the "Old Man," who has never liked the arrogant manner of the current Israeli prime minister.

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So, who will follow the example of Zaire? Togo and Gabon have denied any intentions of doing so even though, in the case of Gabon, Israel has offered to provide that country with military supplies and to build a munitions plant in Libreville. Zambia has also denied it. Cameroon cannot bring itself to do it. Nigeria, the sick giant of OPEC, can only sell its petroleum in the world market right now because the Arabs put pressure on the Western buyers. In short, Zaire went too far, and too early, to be followed by many, even "only" to Tel Aviv.

Despite several more or less embarrassed denials, some governments are waiting for a propitious time to resume relations with Israel. The Central African Republic is tempted to make the move. In November 1981, Ariel Sharon, accompanied by Ariet Ganger, who specializes in the export of Israeli weapons, went to Bangui, where he spoke in the same terms that he had used in Kinshasa: "You are threatened by Libya. Commandos from your country are being trained in Qhadhdhafi's country or in the Palestinian camps of Lebanon. Entrust us with your security. We are used to dealing with terrorism." But Gen Andre Kolingba hesitates. His country gets too much assistance from Iraq--mostly to get its uranium mining going again--to make the decision of giving up that aid. But two other factors are working in favor of Israel: right now, the Central African Republic feels that it is being treated as a poor relation by French cooperation. That country is, therefore, looking for another option which, if not the Libyan or Soviet option, could be the American and Israeli one. All the more so since the Central African regime has close ties with the Mobutu regime, which has now resumed its friendship with Israel.

Another country which is tempted is Kenya. It denies it, of course. At least until President Daniel Arap Moi's terms as acting chairman of the OAU is over. Then he will feel free and will have time to remember that it was in Nairobi, and with the agreement of the Kenyan Government, where the commandos from Tel Aviv established their support base, in early July 1976, during the rescue of the Israeli hostages held at Entebbe Airport in Uganda. Did Kenya receive much money from the Arabs? Yes, about \$339.6 million between 1973 and mid-1981. But Israel and, more particularly, the Zionist lobby in the United States will do their best to replace the Arabs. They will do it because Kenya represents for Israel the maritime access to a key region--East and Central Africa.

In the view of the Israelis, the political and strategic importance of that region lies in two facts. First, it is the African region where Islamic influence is less dominant and where Moslem solidarity will not tilt the balance in favor of the Arabs. Second, it must stand against the Soviet encircling which, in the opinion of Jerusalem, is drawing closer with Angola and Mozambique. Third, that region is the closest to South Africa which, as everybody knows--and no longer denies--is Israel's ally from an objective and subjective standpoint. With Kenya, Zaire, the Central African Republic, Malawi and Swaziland--the two old faithful--the Hebrew state wants to establish or reinforce special relations, because in the view of Israel that region is part of the "Western defense system" against what Ariel Sharon calls "Soviet expansion in Africa." Last February, in an interview with the French weekly PARIS-MATCH, the Israeli defense minister betrayed his real obsession with this subject. Ten times he

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mentioned the name of Africa to emphasize the Soviet threat. France is taken to task by Ariel Sharon for its "passive attitude in East Africa." And Menachem Begin has proposed to President Francois Mitterrand a French-Israeli cooperation (including military cooperation) in the continent. According to some reports, he is said to have even asked Mitterrand to help Israel reestablish relations with the French-speaking African countries. Francois Mitterrand has refused, and on 17 May, answering a question put to him by Radio-France Internationale, he replied: "I cannot see why the countries of Black Africa that recognize Israel should be (prevented) from recognizing Arab countries or vice versa. However, that is their problem. It is not up to me to advise them on how to act in the international arena. That would be totally contrary to my way of doing things and, even more important, contrary to my beliefs. All those countries are of age."

One is apt to believe the French president. All the more so because Israel can become a cumbersome partner (and even dangerous competitor) for France in the political and even in the military sphere. Menachem Begin makes no bones about it. Israel's return to Africa is part of the Israeli-American agreement on strategic cooperation concluded in the name of the defense of the West. France will not get anything out of it since its reputation as a big power is also based on the influence it exerts in Africa. And what about Africa? Which Africa? There is no longer one, but several Africas. The current crisis in the OAU has further split Africa and has, undoubtedly, worked in favor of Israel since that crisis has fostered individual initiatives.

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